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ABSTRACT: Virtues are acquirable, so if intellectual humility is a virtue, it’s acquirable. 
But there is something deeply problematic—perhaps even paradoxical—about aiming to 
be intellectually humble. Drawing on Edward Slingerland’s analysis of the paradoxical 
virtue of wu-wei in Trying Not To Try (New York: Crown, 2014), we argue for an anti-
individualistic conception of the trait, concluding that one’s intellectual humility 
depends upon the intellectual humility of others. Slingerland defines wu-wei as the 
“dynamic, effortless, and unselfconscious state of mind of a person who is optimally 
active and effective” (Trying Not to Try, 7). Someone who embodies wu-wei inspires 
implicit trust, so it is beneficial to appear wu-wei. This has led to an arms race between 
faking wu-wei on the one hand and detecting fakery on the other. Likewise, there are 
many benefits to being (or seeming to be) intellectually humble. But someone who 
makes conscious, strategic efforts to appear intellectually humble is ipso facto not 
intellectually humble. Following Slingerland’s lead, we argue that there are several 
strategies one might pursue to acquire genuine intellectual humility, and all of these 
involve commitment to shared social or epistemic values, combined with receptivity to 
feedback from others, who must in turn have and manifest relevant intellectual virtues. 
In other words, other people and shared values are partial bearers of a given individual’s 
intellectual humility. If this is on the right track, then acquiring intellectual humility 
demands epistemic anti-individualism. 
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1. Introduction 
While growing up, one of the co-authors of this chapter regularly received report 
cards that, in addition to tracking academic progress on topics such as spelling, 
arithmetic, and reading, assessed his progress in acquiring virtues deemed 
important by his school.1 These included executive virtues such as patience and 
                                                                
1 Co-author Mark Alfano carried out some of the research leading to this publication while he 
was affiliated as Visiting Research Fellow at Australian Catholic University. This research was 
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self-control, religious virtues such as reverence, and intellectual virtues such as 
creativity and thoroughness (not to mention alleged virtues for which he 
consistently scored needs improvement, such as obedience). Indeed, many 
parochial and public schools have given their pupils marks for the development of 
character traits. Starting in the late 1980s in the United States, educators bought 
into the self-esteem fad to such an extent that the California State Task Force to 
Promote Self-esteem and Personal and Social Responsibility hailed it as a panacea: 
“Self-esteem is the likeliest candidate for a social vaccine […] that inoculates us 
against the lures of crime, violence, substance abuse, teen pregnancy, child abuse, 
chronic welfare dependency, and educational failure.”2 The task force went on to 
call on every school district in California to “adopt the promotion of self-esteem 
[…] as a clearly stated goal” and to make course work in self-esteem mandatory 
for educators’ “credentials and as part of ongoing in-service training.”3 More 
recently, grit—construed as a kind of long-lasting perseverance4—has been lauded 
as the key to children’s success not only in school but also beyond.5 While there 
are detractors from the suggestion that schools should educate for virtues like self-
esteem6 and grit,7 the contemporary educational establishment has made forays in 
this direction, such as the Intellectual Virtues Academy, a public charter school 
founded in 2013 by philosopher Jason Baehr with funding from the John 
Templeton Foundation.8 
This missionary zeal for character development is understandable. Pupils 
would presumably be better students, better citizens, better scientists, and better 
                                                                                                                                       
also supported by a grant from Fuller Theological Seminary and the Thrive Center. We are 
grateful for the critical feedback provided by Ted Slingerland, David Wong, and Adam Carter.  
2 State of California Department of Education. Toward a State of Esteem: The Final Report of the 
California Task Force to Promote Self-esteem and Personal and Social Responsibility. 
(Sacramento: Bureau of Publications, California State Department of Education, 1990), 4. 
3 Ibid., 6.  
4 Angela L. Duckworth, Christopher Peterson, Michael D. Matthews, and Dennis R. Kelly, “Grit: 
Perseverance and Passion for Long-Term Goals,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
92, 6 (2007): 1087-1101. 
5 Paul Tough, How Children Succeed: Grit, Curiosity, and the Hidden Power of Character 
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012).  
6 Roy F. Baumeister, “Should Schools Try to Boost Self-Esteem? Beware the Dark Side,” 
American Educator 20, 2 (1996): 14-19. 
7 Angela L. Duckworth and David Scott Yeager, “Measurement Matters: Assessing Personal 
Qualities Other Than Cognitive Ability for Educational Purposes,” Educational Researcher 44, 4 
(2015): 237-251. 
8 For more, see http://www.ivalongbeach.org/about/about-iva. 
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workers if their schooling inculcated virtues in addition to imparting domain 
knowledge. If we can do it, surely we should, or at least we may.9  
Yet some virtues are more difficult to educate for than others, due to a 
paradox lurking in their nature. Humility, for instance, is paradoxical because 
typically one cannot truthfully claim to be humble. If you are humble, you don’t 
mention it; if you claim to be humble, you’re probably not.10 Likewise, if modesty 
is distinct from humility (a question we’ll examine in section 4), then prima facie 
the same paradox applies. Wisdom, at least as Socrates presents it in the Apology, 
is paradoxical, since it requires that one know that one knows nothing. Outside of 
a Western context, the Chinese concept of wu-wei (literally “no trying”)—which 
Slingerland defines as the “dynamic, effortless, and unselfconscious state of mind 
of a person who is optimally active and effective”11—has long been recognized as 
similarly paradoxical in the Confucian, Mencian, and Daoist traditions.12  
We are primarily concerned with the problem of how to develop these 
paradoxical virtues, particularly the virtue of intellectual humility. At the 
individual level, developing intellectual humility is fraught with contradiction. By 
consciously striving to become more humble, one might become less so, since 
humility seemingly is a virtue that one can only have by not paying attention to it. 
Institutionalizing the cultivation of intellectual humility, for instance in a school 
context, leads to even more bizarreness. If students receive an ‘A’ in intellectual 
humility, should they be proud of that? Giving high marks for this virtue would 
seem to undermine it (especially if the high marks are dwelt upon). It hardly 
makes sense to educate for X if we don’t even know what X is—the pedagogue’s 
variant of the Meno problem. This doesn’t mean that we have to map out every 
detail of the logical space before we get started, but it does mean that we need a 
rather fine-grained conception that still enjoys widespread recognition (if not 
consensus). In this chapter, we will argue that, counter-intuitively, the 
institutional level is precisely where the focus should be for developing 
                                                                
9 Jason Baehr, “The Situationist Challenge to Educating for Intellectual Virtues,” in Epistemic 
Situationism, eds. Abrol Fairweather and Mark Alfano (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming). 
10 Mark Alfano and Brian Robinson, “Bragging,” Thought 3, 4 (2014): 263-272. 
11 Edward Slingerland, Trying Not to Try: The Art and Science of Spontaneity (New York: 
Crown, 2014): 7. 
12 To be clear, Mencius took himself to be a Confucian, which remains a common interpretation 
of his work (cf., David Wong “Early Confucian Philosophy and the Development of 
Compassion,” Dao 14 (2015): 157-194). Here we follow Slingerland (Trying Not to Try) in 
considering Mencius separately, as there are some important differences between his account of 
wu-wei and that the standard Confucian view.  
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intellectual humility. To make this claim, we will draw on Slingerland’s analysis of 
the paradoxical concept of wu-wei. By finding parallels between intellectual 
humility and wu-wei, we will argue that developing intellectual humility requires 
an anti-individualistic aretaic framework.  
2. Three Problems 
The topic of educating for virtues is helpfully structured around three questions. 
Which virtues? How do we instill those virtues? How can we know whether 
we’ve succeeded? Call these the questions of identification, methodology, and 
operationalization.  
2.1 Identification 
Multiple millennia of philosophizing have not yet succeeded in identifying all and 
only the virtues worth cultivating. Nevertheless, there is more controversy about 
some virtues than others. For instance, honesty and fairness seem to enjoy near-
universal acclaim, while the Christian revaluation of values and subsequent 
Capitalist revaluation have left an ambivalent palimpsest of humility, obedience, 
chastity, ambition, greed, and other alleged virtues (Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 
section 21).13 Should educators aim to inculcate obedience or, as Kant would have 
it,14 the spirit of sapere aude? Even when it comes to near-consensus virtues, 
though, while people may agree on the labels, there often remains a significant 
amount of disagreement about the rich texture of the traits in question. Does 
honesty demand that one never lie, even to the murderous stranger at one’s door? 
Does fairness mean equality or equity (or something else)? The difficulty of 
establishing the rich contours of a virtue also applies to the ones that have 
undergone Nietzschean revaluation: does intellectual humility entail or 
presuppose ignorance or error about oneself? Is it a disposition of behavior, of 
cognition, of affect, or some combination of these? (For explorations of these 
questions, see Hazlett,15 Roberts and Wood,16,17 Samuelson and Church,18 
                                                                
13 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. W. Kaufmann. (New York: Vintage, 1882 / 1974): 
section 21. 
14 Immanuel Kant, “An Answer to the Question: ‘What Is Enlightenment?’” (1784). 
15 Allan Hazlett, “Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility,” Episteme 9, 3 
(2012): 205-223. 
16 Robert Roberts and W. Jay Wood, “Humility and Epistemic Goods,” in Intellectual Virtue: 
Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, eds. Michael DePaul and Linda Zagzebski (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003): 257-279.  
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Whitcomb et al.,19 and Christen et al.20) In this chapter, we will work with an 
intuitive conception of intellectual humility that does not presuppose precise 
answers to these questions. We do so not because we think that the question of 
identification has been solved in this case (far from it), but because we think there 
are even more difficult questions to confront. 
2.2 Methodology 
Supposing we had a list of virtues to be cultivated and a way to measure the extent 
to which pupils embody them, we would then need to fix on some method for 
cultivating these virtues. It’s not clear that every virtue is acquired in the same 
way. The predominance of neo-Aristotelianism in contemporary philosophy 
might lead us to believe that all virtues are acquired through habituation (and that 
we have a good understanding of what habituation is), but things are not so 
simple. For example, Alfano has argued that the habituation model may work for 
some virtues, such as generosity and friendship, for which there is no tension 
between having the virtue and wanting to be in its eliciting conditions.21 There’s 
nothing problematic about generous people wanting to be in a position to benefit 
others. There’s nothing problematic about friends wanting to be in a position to 
commune with one another. But there is something deeply problematic about 
courageous people wanting to be in threatening or dangerous conditions. Indeed, 
such a preference seems like a component of rashness, not courage. Likewise, 
there is something deeply problematic about humble people wanting to be in 
conditions where others are liable to praise them (especially for their humility), 
allowing them to manifest humility by demurring with an “Aw shucks.” Indeed, 
such a preference seems like a component of vanity, not humility. This paradox 
brings to mind a passage from C. S. Lewis’s Screwtape Letters, an epistolary novel 
between two demons who are trying to corrupt someone: 
                                                                                                                                       
17 Robert Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007). 
18 Peter L. Samuelson and Ian M. Church, “When Cognition Turns Vicious: Heuristics and 
Biases in Light of Virtue Epistemology,” Philosophical Psychology 28, 8 (2015): 1095-1113. 
19 Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr, and Daniel Howard-Snyder, “Intellectual 
Humility: Owning Our Limitations,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91, 1 (2015), 
accessed May 16, 2016, doi: 10.1111/phpr.12228. 
20 Markus Christen, Brian Robinson, and Mark Alfano, “The Semantic Space of Intellectual 
Humility,” in Proceedings of the European Conference on Social Intelligence, eds. Andreas 
Herzig and Emiliano Lorini (Toulouse: IRIT-CNRS, 2014): 40-49. 
21 Mark Alfano, Moral Psychology: An Introduction (London: Polity, 2016). 
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Your patient has become humble; have you drawn his attention to the fact? All 
virtues are less formidable to us once the man is aware that he has them, but this 
is specially true of humility. Catch him at the moment when he is really poor in 
spirit and smuggle into his mind the gratifying reflection, ‘By jove! I’m being 
humble,’ and almost immediately pride – pride at his own humility—will appear. 
If he awakes to the danger and tries to smother this new form of pride, make him 
proud of his attempt.22 
Developing intellectual humility through conscious habituation at the 
individual level does not appear promising. As already mentioned, at the 
institutional level, the problems appear equally vexing. Should students be proud 
of improving their intellectual humility score from one semester to the next? 
Should teachers rescind high grades for intellectual humility if they detect pride 
on the part of the student? Giving out bumper stickers that read, “My Child is an 
Honor Student and Intellectually Humble,” would be counter-productive to say 
the least. Little attention has been paid to the paradox of cultivating paradoxical 
virtues in Western philosophy. Chinese philosophers, on the other hand, have 
grappled with this problem for centuries via the concept of wu-wei. The 
Confucian, Mencian, and Doaist traditions all opt for resolving this paradox at the 
institutional (or cultural) level, rather than the individual level, which we take to 
be suggestive of how to resolve the paradox for intellectual humility.  
2.3 Operationalization 
When students learn their multiplication tables, their schools typically test how 
well they’ve learned the material. If we were to educate for virtues, similar 
evaluations would be needed. Assessing character traits, however, is not as simple 
as administering a test with multiplication problems. One common way to 
operationalize personality and character traits is via self-report questionnaires: I 
yam what I say I yam, plus or minus standard error. This is how both self-esteem23 
and grit24 are typically measured. Self-report can be supplemented by informant-
report, i.e., asking people who know someone well to fill out a third-person 
version of the self-report scale.25 When it comes to intellectual virtues in an 
educational context, neither of these methods looks very attractive. After all, if 
students know that they are being assessed not only for their mastery of cognitive 
                                                                
22 C. S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters (New York: Touchstone, 1942 / 1961), 58. 
23 Morris Rosenberg, Society and the Adolescent Self-Image (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1965). 
24 Duckworth et al., “Grit.”  
25 Simine Vazire and Erika N. Carlson, “Self-Knowledge of Personality: Do People Know 
Themselves?,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 4 (2010) 605-620. 
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content and skills but also for their embodiment of character traits, then at least 
the ambitious ones among them are likely to provide answers to self-report 
questionnaires that make them look good. And while this self-serving bias might 
be tempered somewhat by having teachers fill out informant reports, there are 
reasons to worry that various biases—both explicit and implicit—of teachers 
would undermine their reliability as informants. These concerns are especially 
pertinent when it comes to intellectual humility and other paradoxical virtues in 
an institutional setting. Filling out a self-report questionnaire about one’s own 
intellectual humility, when one knows that the stakes are high (e.g., being 
admitted to a more prestigious university or receiving scholarship funds), is 
basically an invitation to brag. But bragging is one of the things that humble 
people characteristically don’t do.26 These considerations suggest that indirect and 
behavioral operationalizations of intellectual virtues are to be preferred, but such 
operationalizations are much harder to develop and validate. To our knowledge, 
no valid and reliable behavioral test of intellectual humility exists. Like the 
question of identification, the question of the operationalization is addressed only 
indirectly in this chapter, via our exploration of the question of methodology. 
3. Wu-Wei and Its Cultivation 
Ian James Kidd argues that while the common Western conceptions of humility 
and intellectual humility suffer from serious conceptual and psychological 
incoherencies, Eastern philosophy has much to offer in this context.27 For Kidd, 
intellectual humility amounts to an appropriately calibrated confidence in one’s 
intellectual capacities. While we agree with much of Kidd’s analysis of intellectual 
humility, we contend that he overlooks the paradoxicality of educating for 
intellectual humility. Because this issue deserves further attention, we follow 
Kidd’s lead in looking beyond the Western philosophical tradition and examining 
conceptions of virtues in Chinese philosophy.  
Slingerland’s recent analysis of the state of wu-wei (and the related concept 
of de) provides an interesting parallel.28 Wu-wei is a state of action that 
                                                                
26 Alfano and Robinson, “Bragging,” 271. 
27 Ian J. Kidd, “Educating for Intellectual Humility,” in Educating for Intellectual Virtues: 
Applying Virtue Epistemology to Educational Theory and Practice, ed. Jason Baehr (London: 
Routledge, forthcoming). 
28 We recognize that Slingerland’s account of wu-wei is not the only one in the literature. Wong 
(Early Confucian Philosophy”) for instance offers a different account. We here opt for an 
examination of Slingerland’s account only for the parallels then available between developing 
wu-wei and educating for intellectual humility. If one were to reject Slingerland’s view, then 
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nevertheless feels effortless. “People in wu-wei feel as if they are doing nothing, 
while at the same time they might be creating a brilliant work of art, smoothly 
negotiating a complex social situation, or even bringing the entire world into 
harmonious order. […] People who are in wu-wei have de, typically translated as 
‘virtue,’ ‘power,’ or charismatic power.’”29 Not surprisingly, one cannot simply opt 
to be in wu-wei; one must paradoxically try not to try. Since we are not scholars 
of ancient Chinese philosophy, we will draw upon Slingerland’s analysis of wu-
wei rather than offering a novel interpretation. Our interest in wu-wei instead 
derives from its analogy with intellectual humility:30 
 Having and manifesting wu-wei or intellectual humility tends to lead 
to smooth and spontaneous cooperation with others, avoiding pitfalls 
associated with strategic cooperation in mixed-motive games. 
 It is prudentially valuable to appear wu-wei or intellectually humble 
because this appearance tends to lead to being trusted by others. 
 The prudential value of appearing wu-wei or intellectually humble 
means that people may be tempted to fake these virtues and that people 
may be suspicious of those who seem to be faking.31  
 Having wu-wei or intellectual humility entails or is at least strongly 
associated with being connected to a larger or higher value than 
oneself, and sharing that value-laden connection with others.32  
 Focusing overly much on whether one has or is in the process of 
acquiring wu-wei or intellectual humility is in serious tension—if not 
outright contradiction—with actually having or acquiring the trait. 
 Explicitly attending in the moment to whether one is manifesting wu-
wei or intellectual humility is in serious tension—if not outright 
                                                                                                                                       
some of the parallels would collapse, but the more central points about methods for educating 
for the paradoxical virtue of intellectual humility would remain.  
29 Slingerland, Trying Not to Try, 7-8.  
30 ‘Wu-wei’ can refer to a cognitive-affective state that one can slip into and out of, or to the 
virtue associated with the disposition to enter and remain in this state. This is consistent with 
the language associated with other virtues. For example, ‘curious’ can refer to a cognitive-
affective state that motivates one to investigate, or the virtue associated with the disposition to 
enter and remain in this state. For more on the polysemy of virtue-language, see Adam Morton, 
“Epistemic emotions,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion, ed. Peter Goldie 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 385-399.  
31 Rolf Reber and Edward G. Slingerland, “Confucius Meets Cognition: New Answers to Old 
Questions,” Religion, Brain & Behavior 1, 2 (2011): 135-145.  
32 Slingerland, Trying Not to Try, 15. 
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contradiction—with both manifesting the trait and being perceived to 
manifest the trait.33 
These points of analogy lead us to believe that solutions to the paradox of 
cultivating wu-wei may serve as model solutions to the paradox of cultivating 
intellectual humility. According to Slingerland,34 there are three main (partial) 
solutions to the paradox of wu-wei, which we will refer to as the early Confucian, 
the Mencian, and the Daoist.  
3.1 Early Confucian Solutions to the Paradox of Cultivating Wu-Wei 
As Slingerland explains, the early Confucian tradition views human nature as a 
shapeless block of recalcitrant material, into which form is imbued through 
effortful engagement in various cultural forms. People are born neither good nor 
bad, but become so as the block of their nature is carved and polished. This may 
sound to Western ears a bit like Aristotle’s conception of human nature, which 
starts off without virtues or vices but acquires such traits through habituation. 
There are important differences, however. First, Aristotle thought that humans 
have a natural telos (end): rational activity. As we will see below, this allies him 
more with Mencius (who likewise believed in natural human teleology) than with 
the early Confucian tradition, which sees human nature as initially formless. In 
addition, Aristotle held that at least some humans are born with “natural virtues,” 
dispositions that are behaviorally identical to full-fledged virtues but which are 
not underwritten by practical wisdom. For the early Confucians, becoming 
virtuous is difficult because it requires either eliminating “natural” dispositions or 
unlearning non-ideal habits of mind and action. Cultivating wu-wei might thus be 
compared to a kind of forgetting rather than a kind of learning.35 
Most importantly, however, the method of acquiring or cultivating virtue 
suggested by the early Confucian tradition is very different from Aristotle’s model. 
Aristotle flat-footedly held that virtue is acquired through habituation (“the things 
we have to learn before we do them, we learn by doing them”36). His method is 
                                                                
33 For more on these last two points, see David S. Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism: 
Investigations in Chinese Philosophy (La Salle: Open Court, 1996), 31-43 and Reber and 
Slingerland “Confucius Meets Cognition.” 
34 Slingerland, Trying Not to Try. 
35 For a contemporary perspective on the difficulty presented by forgetting and unlearning, see 
Bruno S. Frey, “‘Just Forget It.’ Memory Distortion as Bounded Rationality,” Mind & Society 4 
(2005): 13-25. 
36 Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, trans. W.D. Ross and L. Brown (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2009): 1103b 
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direct. The early Confucian method, by contrast, is highly indirect. How is wu-
wei cultivated? According to Reber and Slingerland, “this sort of effortless 
virtuous action is portrayed as the result of extended training in traditional 
cultural forms, including rituals and music.”37 While they go on to mention more 
direct cultural forms such as “repeated oral and mental rehearsals of moral 
exemplary narratives and maxims,”38 it is important to recognize just how 
different this is from the Aristotelian model. 
But how do such indirect forms of aretaic training produce their unexpected 
fruit? According to Slingerland, the early Confucians were aware, if only 
implicitly, that repetition of rituals, music, and other cultural forms in a social 
setting tends to lead to affective attunement to and bonding with the other people 
who are also engaged in this repetition. It’s hard to chant together without such 
attunement. It’s hard to sing together without such attunement. Moreover, to the 
extent that cultural forms like singing and ritual express values, repeating them 
together tends to lead to a sense of shared values. And to express such values well 
in a ritual setting, one must have appropriate facial expressions and posture, direct 
one’s gaze appropriately, and engage in a wide variety of other embodied 
behaviors. These are precisely the kinds of behaviors that, later on, are hard to 
fake (e.g., the Duchenne—or genuine—smile involving both check and eye 
muscles) and are treated as reliable indicators of sincerity and trustworthiness. De, 
or moral charisma, can thus be understood naturalistically as the suite or signature 
of facial micro-expressions and other hard-to-fake, automatic behaviors that 
indicate that someone is not exercising much top-down effortful control of their 
behavior and demeanor.39  
On top of this, communal repetition directs one’s attention outward, to the 
complex, coordinated activity of which one is a part. Such outward-direction is 
characteristic of someone who is in wu-wei (and, as we will see below, 
intellectually humble). Communal repetition also tends to involve joint attention 
with co-celebrants and co-observants. Cognitive science is increasingly finding 
that direction of gaze and length of fixation are reliable indicators of preference 
and predictors of behavior,40 thus providing empirical support for the early 
Confucian method. Finally, repetition, both alone and (even more so) in a group is 
                                                                
37 Reber and Slingerland, “Confucius Meets Cognition,” 135. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Slingerland, Trying Not to Try. 
40 Philip Pärnamets, Petter Johansson, Lars Hall, Christian Balkenius, Michael J. Spivey, and 
Daniel C. Richardson, “Biasing Moral Decision by Exploiting the Dynamics of Eye Gaze,” 
Proceedings of the National Academy of the Sciences of the United States of America 112, 13 
(2015): 4170-4175. 
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tied to fluency, positive affect, and judged truth of what is repeated. The wu-wei 
person engages in smooth, fluent action, according to the early Confucians, in part 
because they are so practiced in these cultural forms. Positive affect makes such 
action intrinsically rewarding and thus more likely to be repeated; it also is 
associated with hard-to-fake expressions of face, posture, and tone of voice. And 
when the items being repeated are morally exemplary narratives and maxims, the 
trainee becomes more likely to endorse the values embedded in these narratives 
and maxims. Extensive engagement with these moral and cultural technologies 
leads to internalization of values and norms that “obviates rational elaboration” 
and “is supposed to transform moralistic attitudes derived from mere duty to 
religious attitudes that emphasize the joy of doing what needs to be done.”41  
3.2 Mencian Solutions to the Paradox of Cultivating Wu-Wei 
Mencius was himself a continuer of the Confucian tradition, so it might seem odd 
to contrast his approach to cultivating wu-wei with the approach of his 
predecessors. However, as Slingerland and others have pointed out, the Mencian 
model is importantly different in several respects.42 For one thing, Mencius held 
that human nature essentially tended toward the good, though not perfect, 
whereas the early Confucians accorded basic human nature no moral valence. The 
main point of difference, however, relates to the metaphor Mencius uses as a 
model for moral development. Whereas the early Confucians preferred the 
metaphor of carving and polishing a hard, shapeless block, Mencius famously 
employed the agricultural metaphor of sprouts of moral virtue that, when 
appropriately cultivated over time, come to fruition. There are four such sprouts: 
ren (care or benevolence), yi (shame or righteousness), li (courtesy or propriety), 
and shi (sense of right and wrong, or wisdom).43 The sprouts of virtue point us in 
the right direction from early childhood, and if they are appropriately cultivated 
in a friendly socio-moral environment, they will develop into full-fledged virtues. 
Moreover, because the sprouts are essentially goal-directed, they can be perverted 
but cannot be turned completely against their nature into just anything. As 
Slingerland puts it, in the sprout metaphor, “natural or pre-existing structure plays 
                                                                
41 Reber and Slingerland, “Confucius Meets Cognition,” 139.  
42 For more discussion of the Mencian model and various Western models (Kant, Hume, Rawls, 
and Haidt), see David Morrow “Moral Psychology and the ‘Mencian creature,’” Philosophical 
Psychology 22, 3 (2009): 281-304 and Owen Flanagan, Moral Sprouts and Natural Teleologies: 
21st Century Moral Psychology Meets Classical Chinese Philosophy (Milwaukee: Marquette 
University Press, 2014).  
43 Philip J. Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, 2nd edition (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000). 
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a crucial role in determining the final product: a face that is not already well-
formed will not be made beautiful through cosmetics, and a barley sprout will 
never, no matter what sort of cultivation it receives, produce corn. The sprout 
metaphor in particular is deployed to emphasize the presence of a natural telos, a 
normal and dynamic course of development.”44  
For Mencius, then, the process of developing virtue involves the patient 
extension of pre-existing dispositions to new eliciting conditions. Consider, for 
instance, ren, which Mencius plausibly thinks leads almost everyone to feel 
compassion for cute babies and furry animals when they are clearly suffering, and 
to motivate action to end their suffering. Extending ren so that its descriptive 
eliciting conditions match as closely as possible its normative eliciting conditions 
is what he means by cultivating this moral sprout. Such extension does not 
proceed all at once, but rather slowly, through affect-laden analogies of cognition 
and perception. The person who is developing ren comes to see and emotionally 
appreciate that the suffering of a cute baby is morally indistinguishable from the 
suffering of someone with an ugly deformity, which leads them to respond in the 
same way to this new case as they would to the initial case. Universal 
benevolence, the ultimate telos of ren, is not arrived at in a flash but rather by 
slowing extending the analogy to nearby eliciting conditions. Moreover, universal 
benevolence is therefore not opposed, as many in the Western tradition would 
have it, to partial love of one’s nearest and dearest but in fact grows out of such 
emotional attachments. 
How are sprouts of virtue such as ren cultivated and extended? Mencius 
identifies two main factors.45 First, just like agricultural sprouts, moral sprouts 
grow best when nourished and protected. In other words, people are more 
inclined to extend their virtues under material and political conditions of 
prosperity, safety, and security. Developmentally, then, virtues depend on 
external features of the physical and social world. Second, just like agricultural 
sprouts, moral sprouts grow best in a fitting culture. Corn grows well next to 
beans, peas, and parsley, but not next to cabbage or celery. Likewise, moral sprouts 
grow best in good socio-cultural company. On the cultural side, Mencius retains 
an emphasis on ritual, though he puts less weight on it than the early Confucians. 
On the social side, Mencius emphasizes the importance of the four traditional 
                                                                
44 Edward Slingerland, “Crafting Bowls, Cultivating Sprouts: Unavoidable Tensions in Early 
Chinese Confucianism,” Dao 14 (2015): 213-214. 
45 Bryan Van Norden, “Mencius,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Winter 2014 
edition, ed. E. Zalta, accessed May 6, 2016, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/ 
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Chinese relationships: father-son, lord-minister, husband-wife, and friend-friend. 
Once again, we see that, at least from a developmental point of view, virtues 
essentially depend on ongoing emotional feedback from a social world to which 
the agent is attuned and attached.46  
3.3 Daoist Solutions to the Paradox of Cultivating Wu-Wei 
Wu-wei appears most frequently as an object of explicit philosophical reflection in 
the Daoist tradition associated with Laozi (through the Daodejing) and later 
Zhuangzi (through the eponymous text). In this context, wu-wei is often 
contrasted invidiously with more direct forms of practical activity that tend to 
backfire. For instance, in chapter 66 of the Daodejing, the would-be ruler is 
advised prudentially to humble himself before the people rather than lord it over 
them.47 The Daoist approach to the good life is deeply interconnected with Daoist 
metaphysics, which we naturally do not have the space to delve into here. Two 
aspects of Daoism stand out, however. 
First, the Daoist tradition eschews moralizing, favoring instead a celebration 
of focused and absorbed activity in the moment. This is illustrated by the famous 
example of Cook Ding, who manifests such remarkable skill in carving meat from 
bones that his knife never gets stuck or nicks a bone even when going through a 
joint. Ding is able to accomplish this feat by focusing intently and tuning out 
everything beyond his current task. Furthermore, he enjoys his work and finds it 
rewarding for its own sake, not thinking about the external benefits or praise he 
might receive for his expert performance. Such intrinsically-motivated, skilled, 
and immersive activity is meant to be emblematic of (or perhaps even of a piece 
with) virtuous activity. The person with wu-wei is so deeply immersed in what 
they are doing and accomplishing, so engrossed in the current task, that strategic 
considerations do not arise and therefore do not distract from or undermine 
                                                                
46 For more on this idea of emotional feedback, see Mark Alfano, Character as Moral Fiction 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); “What Are the Bearers of Virtues?” in 
Advances in Experimental Moral Psychology, eds. Hagop Sarkissian and Jennifer Cole Wright 
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47 David Wong, “Chinese Ethics,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2013 edition, 
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virtuous activity. Such immersion is comparable to the intense focus required to 
engage successfully with cultural forms like chant and dance: explicitly thinking 
about what you’re doing while you do it is liable to interfere with skilled activity. 
Unlike the early Confucians, however, the Daoists seem to think that this sort of 
immersion in activity is best achieved not through highly constrained ritual but 
through laser-like focus on the here and now. What the two have in common is 
their indirectness. Someone who is single-mindedly intent on performing a ritual 
activity perfectly has little or no cognitive bandwidth available for strategic 
thinking; likewise, someone who is single-mindedly focused on pursuing a valued 
goal has little or no cognitive bandwidth available for strategic thinking. Such 
people can be trusted not to be looking for opportunities for side deals, strategic 
betrayals, and so on. This aspect of Daoist ethics thus emphasizes finely-attuned 
engagement with external activities, precluding unnecessary attention to the self 
during action. 
Second, the Daoist tradition, especially in the Daodejing, alternates between 
awe or wonder at the vastness of the cosmos and derision or amusement at 
human’s belief in their own self-importance. While the connection with humility 
goes without saying, the connection with wu-wei is also important. Wu-wei 
involves, among other things, an attunement to and appreciation of values greater 
than oneself. These values can be construed as higher in a religious sense or as 
larger in a more naturalistic sense. The point is that one feels oneself connected 
with and even contributing to something greater than oneself. Such an attitude 
naturally combines with the sense that other people are connected with and 
contributing to the same higher or greater value, making trust, cooperation, and 
fluent communication possible. Moreover, recent work in empirical moral 
psychology48 suggests that the emotions of awe, wonder, and elevation do indeed 
lead to pro-social (especially in-group favoring) motivation and behavior.49 50 
Thus, in the Daoist tradition, as in the early Confucian and Mencian traditions, we 
find that wu-wei is best cultivated indirectly. In the case of Daoism, two of the 
primary methods involving tuning out long-term strategic considerations by 
tuning into the here and now, and bolstering one’s sense of shared, larger values 
with others by experiencing shared awe or wonder with them. 
                                                                
48 Simone Schnall, Jean Roper, and Daniel M.T. Fessler, “Elevation Leads to Altruistic Behavior,” 
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4. Parallel Solutions to the Intellectual Humility Paradox 
We can summarize the three kinds of solutions to the paradox of wu-wei as 
follows. On the Confucian model, wu-wei involves being deeply entrenched in a 
system of social rituals, joint attention on external values, and a sort of 
automaticity and fluency from practice. On the Mencian model, you need the 
right material, social, and political environment to grow the sprouts, as well as 
ongoing engagement in the four traditional relationships. Finally, on the Daoist 
model, it’s all about being engaged with an external value and not prone to 
strategic thinking. We propose to solve the paradox of cultivating intellectual 
humility by borrowing elements from each of these solutions. To do that, it will 
be helpful to distinguish modesty from humility.  
4.1 Humility and Modesty 
Just as there are obvious advantages to being wu-wei, so too are there benefits to 
being humble. For instance, Van Tongeren et al. report that humility helps initiate 
and maintain romantic relationships.51 Owens et al. provide evidence that 
humility has numerous benefits for leaders and employees in organizations.52 
Those scoring high on the honesty-humility construct of the HEXACO personality 
inventory53 tend to be more cooperative.54 Wu-wei is, according to the 
Confucians, hard to fake. But is the same true of humility? The term ‘false 
modesty’ is not uncommon in the parlance of our times. Yet it is not immediately 
clear whether it is synonymous with ‘false humility.’ To a rough determination, 
Google Ngram (which compares the frequency of two or more terms over time 
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across Google’s database of millions of books published over centuries) shows that 
‘false modesty’ is a more common expression than ‘false humility.’55  
 
Figure 1. Google Ngram shows the frequency of the terms ‘false modesty’ and 
‘false humility’ by year from 1840-2008 in the millions of books in the Google 
Ngram database. 
This suggests that modesty and humility are not equivalent. What is missing 
is a conceptual means for distinguishing between them.56  
To fill this conceptual lacuna, consider the hypothetical case of Holly and 
Molly. Behaviorally, they are fairly indistinguishable. They both do not boast; 
they engage in self-deprecation when praised by others; they tend not to behave 
in a manner intended to draw excessive attention to themselves. If praised, both 
would tend to say something like, “Thank you, but I’m not that special.” They 
both also generally lack the intention to impress others, which is why they don’t 
brag. Consequently, both can rightly be called modest. Yet, Molly is very anxious 
                                                                
55 We recognize that Google Ngram is not without faults, as recently pointed out by Eitan Adam 
Pechenick, Christopher M. Danforth, and Peter Sheridan Dodds, “Characterizing the Google 
Books Corpus: Strong Limits to Inferences of Socio-Cultural and Linguistic Evolution,” PLoS 
ONE 10, 10 (2015): e0137041. Accessed May 22, 2016, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0137041. 
Nevertheless, we contend that at least in this case it provides a suggestive starting point.  
56 This difference in frequency of use does not establish a difference in meaning. ‘Water’ is more 
common than ‘H2O,’ though they both have the same referent. In the case of ‘false modesty’ and 
‘false humility,’ the difference is suggestive not only that there is a difference but perhaps even 
that ‘false humility’ fails to refer. The hypothetical case of Holly and Molly is meant as a 
conceptual basis for distinguishing false modesty from false humility.  
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for others to be impressed with her, just not directly by her.57 If she were to brag, 
others may be less impressed because she drew attention to herself. She doesn’t 
believe her self-deprecating statements are true. So Molly is very aware of aspects 
of herself that are praiseworthy and is desirous of praise for them, but doesn’t 
directly draw attention to them. Holly, on the other hand, does not attend much 
to herself, and that is why she doesn’t brag. She typically lacks occurrent beliefs 
about anything praiseworthy about herself. On the basis of this difference, we can 
assert that Holly is humble (and modest) while Molly is only modest.  
Our intuition is that Molly embodies false modesty. Typically, when 
something is described as a ‘false X,’ the meaning is that it is not actually an X, 
such as false prophet. So it might seem that our notion of false modesty entails that 
Molly is not actually possessing modesty. Driver holds this same view, arguing 
that a falsely modest person knows something good or praiseworthy about herself 
but feigns ignorance.58 Given our distinction between humility and modesty, we 
think that false modesty is something of a misnomer. Molly does in fact exhibit 
modesty. The reason that some may want to criticize Molly, however, is that she 
lacks humility, though she is attempting to deceive us about this fact by means of 
her modesty. Though she is modest in not bragging, she is fully aware of her 
bragging rights. So there may be something disingenuous about Molly’s modesty, 
since her beliefs do not correspond with her behavior. But she is modest all the 
same; it’s her humility that is false.  
4.2 Lessons from Wu-Wei 
If this distinction between modesty and humility is on the right track, then it 
points to several lessons from wu-wei that can be applied to the paradox of 
intellectual humility. The solutions to the paradox of wu-wei offered by the 
Confucian and Doaist traditions (and to a lesser extent the Mencian tradition as 
well) were in tension. When it comes to intellectual humility though, we will 
attempt to integrate these traditions. By bringing into conversation Doaist- and 
Confucian-inspired solutions to the paradox of intellectual humility, the product is 
                                                                
57 It should come as no surprise that the social norm against bragging is stronger for women (cf., 
Jessi L. Smith and Meghan Huntoon, “Women’s Bragging Rights: Overcoming Modesty Norms 
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58 Julia Driver, Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 17-18.  
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an enriched conception of how to educate for this virtue. The Mencian tradition 
then supplies a final element missing from the other two through its emphasis on 
particular relationships.  
As we noted, the Daoists emphasize that one cannot be in wu-wei for 
strategic reasons; one just is in wu-wei and thereby reaps the benefits as a side 
effect. Molly’s refusal to brag is strategic: she recognizes that bragging can backfire 
in attempting to impress others. Holly, on the other hand, is humble without 
regard to the strategic advantage that her humility can provide. The first lesson, 
then, is that if we seek to educate for intellectual humility, we shouldn’t 
encourage students (or people generally) to become humble instrumentally, in 
order to reap the rewards for humility. A growing body of empirical research is 
finding benefits for humility, but focusing on those benefits is liable to produce at 
best strategically modest individuals like Molly.  
The benefits of intellectual humility specifically are so far only conceptually 
argued for and not yet empirically corroborated. Kidd59 argues persuasively for 
intellectual humility as “a virtue for the management of confidence,” whereby one 
has an accurate and not undue confidence in one’s own intellectual abilities.60 At 
the very least then, possessing intellectual humility entails a recognition of one’s 
own fallibility. An intellectually humble agent is at least somewhat receptive to 
critical feedback from others, as well as considering others’ differing viewpoints 
on controversial topics. More simply, intellectually humble people are open-
minded.61 They will not automatically dismiss or ignore the correction of a peer or 
superior (such as a teacher), for such behavior is the hallmark of intellectual 
arrogance. Open-mindedness is a widely shared social value. As we saw already, 
part of the Doaist solution to the paradox of wu-wei was through emphasis on 
shared external values. In the context of intellectual humility, institutionally 
emphasizing the importance of receptivity to feedback plays the same role. This 
emphasis should take two forms. First greater class time should be devoted to 
providing critical feedback to students. Second, beyond providing time for this 
feedback, there should also be explicit discussion of the value of critical feedback 
with emphasis on why it is important and useful. By teaching students the value of 
critical feedback—both for them and for society in general—schools are indirectly 
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educating for intellectual humility without prodding students to try to be 
intellectually humble.  
While this adaptation of Doaism to the problem of educating for intellectual 
humility has considerable merit, there is more to be said. The problem still 
remains of how to get students to become actually intellectually humble instead of 
just faking it. Students, for instance, could presumably feign to listen to critical 
feedback or the views of others, but not take seriously their own fallibility. As 
Reber and Slingerland notes, “Of course, part of the concern with real virtue lies 
in the fact that people may fake ritual performance and virtuous behavior to attain 
the benefits of group membership—a central concern in early Confucianism.”62 
The falsely humble Molly is what Confucius hatefully calls the “village poseur,” 
“who goes through all the motions of being good but is in the end a hollow 
counterfeit of virtue.”63 The Confucian solution to the danger of the village 
poseur—who blocks the development of true virtue in herself and in others—is to 
use social ritual in two ways. First, in the ensuing arms race between those 
wanting to fake wu-wei and those wanting to expose the village poseurs, social 
rituals offer a method of detection and increase the cost of faking it. The thought 
is that typically only those in wu-wei will be able to correctly and consistently 
perform the rituals. Second, because these rituals require a considerable 
investment of time or other resources, those who might otherwise be tempted to 
fake it are likely to deem the cost too high.  
In terms of intellectual humility, we already have some rituals in place. 
Merely not bragging or saying “Aw shucks,” when praised aren’t enough to 
conclusively demonstrate intellectual humility. There are subtle nuances in 
behavior that Holly may exhibit, but not Molly. Molly may pause too long before 
demurring, for instance. Humans are quite good at detecting such subtle 
behavioral nuances in other contexts. We, for instance, are often inclined to 
distinguish between people who genuinely feel happy and those who are merely 
faking it. One way we do that is noticing the subtle difference between Duchenne 
smiles (where one’s ocular muscles also contract) and a fake, eyeless smile. This 
method isn’t foolproof, but it is fairly reliable.64 For Confucius, developing more 
complex and demanding social rituals was an effective means for discovering and 
discouraging the village poseur. To discourage Molly from faking intellectual 
humility, the Confucian solution would be to establish social rituals that are 
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sufficiently costly in time or other resources to make faking intellectual humility 
no longer worth it. Luckily, the relationship we already noted between 
intellectual humility and open-mindedness provides a basis for establishing such 
rituals. Our worry was that some might feign open-mindedness, but not really 
consider the objections, corrections, or worldviews of others. Useful social rituals 
would therefore include a battery of tests to establish the extent to which people 
actually were open-minded. The educational context is ready-made for such 
rituals. In a classroom setting, this would involve looking for the application of 
critical feedback. Thus, teachers need to create opportunities for and a social ritual 
of constructive feedback from the teacher and fellow students, and then encourage 
and test for the application of that feedback.  
Furthermore, social rituals can provide a fake-it-till-you-make method of 
developing a virtue. As Slingerland puts it, “Confucius’s strategy seems to be an 
injunction to just keep plugging away.”65 Perhaps, then, faking modesty is a viable 
means of cultivating humility. Perhaps Molly, by not bragging about her 
praiseworthy characteristics, will eventually come to not think about them often 
either. In so doing, she would follow the Confucian solution of practiced 
repetition producing automatic and effortless results: Molly’s not bragging would 
eventually lead to her not even realizing she has something to brag about. “People 
can try to fake virtue by simulating virtuous behavior, but […] even the act of 
faking can become self-defeating when an actor does not intend to be virtuous, 
instead becoming so as a result of his or her behavior.”66  
The Doaists were skeptical of the fake-it-till-you-make-it solution of the 
Confucians, since they saw this approach as being “incapable of producing 
anything other than village poseurs. The very act of trying to be good fatally 
contaminates the goal.”67 As Slingerland admits, however, it is far from clear in the 
Daodejing how one is supposed to stop trying, relax, and spontaneously slip into 
wu-wei, though meditation is a key practice. Laozi, the reputed author of the 
Daodejing, speaks of returning to the “mind of an infant” as the best way to 
achieve wu-wei.   
When it comes intellectual humility, we think the matter is slightly less 
difficult, at least in an educational context. Students can fail to be intellectually 
humble when they become prideful of an intellectual skill or accomplishment. 
Individually, they will then have a hard time cajoling themselves into being 
intellectually humble. Institutionally, educators could attempt to discourage such 
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pride when evidenced and encourage humility instead, though as we’ve seen 
drawing attention to intellectual humility in this manner is likely to be 
counterproductive. Alternatively, educators could attempt to prevent the pride in 
the first place by distracting the student from the fact that she has done something 
praiseworthy. For instance, when a student masters a challenging topic after 
considerable effort, the educator could introduce a new challenge before 
intellectual pride takes hold, i.e., the positive learning outcome is acknowledged, 
but not dwelt upon. Holly was not ignorant of what is praiseworthy about herself; 
she doesn’t focus on it because she has other things to do. From this perspective, 
humility isn’t a virtue of ignorance (pace Driver) but a virtue of distraction. It’s 
the virtue of those with more important things to do. Continually re-engaging and 
challenging students anew can foster such intellectual humility.  
Finally, building on the role of the educator in cultivating intellectual 
humility, we can return to the Mencian and Confucian solutions that emphasize 
the role of society. For Confucius, wu-wei is achieved through participating in 
social rituals; they can’t be done alone. Mencius also stressed particular 
relationships. In the context of educating for intellectual humility, we can 
emphasize three: student-teacher, student-parent, and student-student. In the 
student-teacher relationship, the teacher should model intellectual humility, 
which would include not bragging, considering differing views of others, and 
freely admitting to being wrong. Such behavior makes imitation easier for the 
students. Additionally, seeing an authority figure such as a teacher admit to being 
wrong when corrected can help de-stigmatize the same behavior in students. 
Furthermore, rituals in a classroom can be developed for students to imitate these 
behaviors. One such ritual could be having students praise someone (not in the 
class) for being intellectually humble. Finally, the teacher has the ability also to 
reward intellectual achievements, and not to reward intellectual arrogance for 
those achievements.  
5. Anti-Individualism and Educating for Paradoxical Virtues 
Our objective is this paper is not to develop Confucian rituals for cultivating 
intellectual humility; neither is it our aim to articulate precisely what sort of 
Daoist-inspired techniques educators could use to distract students from their 
intellectual praiseworthiness. While these topics are important, our goal here is to 
articulate why educating for intellectual humility requires an anti-individualistic 
solution to the paradox of intellectual humility. To make this claim, it is necessary 
that we make clear what we mean by anti-individualism.  
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Anti-individualism is a form of externalism. Yet, as Carter el al. note, the 
internalist/externalist distinction takes different forms in different contexts.68 In 
the philosophy of mind, active externalism is the view that the vehicle’s mental 
states or cognitive processes extend beyond individual (human) organisms to 
include the external world around them. Clark and Chalmers, for instance, present 
the thought experiment of Otto, who has Alzheimer’s but also has an extensive 
and well-organized notebook, in which he finds the address for MoMA on 53rd 
Street. 69 Clark and Chalmers argue that this notebook is functionally equivalent to 
the brain-embodied memory of another character, Inga, who remembers the same 
address in the more familiar way. Just as Inga’s mind is functionally constituted by 
processes and states in her brain, so Otto’s mind is functionally constituted by 
processes and states in his brain+notebook.  
Recently, Alfano has adapted active externalism in philosophy mind to 
virtue theory, claiming, “A virtue is not a monadic property of an agent, but a 
triadic relation among an agent, a social milieu, and an asocial environment.”70 
This view is in opposition to the standard account of virtues as being properties of 
individuals (cf., Russell71 and Slote72). Alfano draws extensively on the recent 
situationist debate in virtue theory regarding the role that non-moral situational 
factors (such as foul odors, dim lighting, or finding a dime) can have on the 
manifestation of character traits.73 Doris74 and Harman75 contend that the fact that 
these situational factors exert such powerful influence on our behavior militates 
against confidence in robust virtues and vices. Alfano argues instead that our 
character traits depend in part on these external, situational factors. More 
importantly for our purposes, however, is Alfano’s extension of virtues to social 
influences. “When an agent is functionally integrated through ongoing feedback 
loops with her social environment, the environment doesn’t just causally 
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influence her but becomes part of her character.”76 In a virtuous feedback loop, 
other people and shared values are partial bearers of a given individual’s virtue.77 
Alfano discusses such feedback loops in connection with virtues such as 
trustworthiness and trustingness, arguing that these can form an interlocking dyad 
and thus be mutually constitutive.78 Our contention here is that intellectual 
humility is another example, in that one person’s humility could depend 
constitutively on the humility of another person with whom they are in ongoing 
and highly-attuned contact.  
In borrowing from the Confucian, Mencian, and Doaist solutions to the 
paradox of wu-wei, the answer to the paradox of intellectual humility that we are 
propose relies heavily on these virtuous feedback loops. As Slingerland notes, 
“Cultivated behaviors have a small positive effect on [other people], which causes 
them to act in an incrementally more morally positive way, which in turn feeds 
back on us.”79 Sarkissian also focusing on lessons for virtue ethics from 
Confucianism, notes that “the interconnectedness of all social behavior, how we 
are inextricably implicated in the actions of others, and how minor tweaks in our 
own behavior—such as our facial expressions, posture, tone of voice, and other 
seemingly minor details of comportment—can lead to major payoffs in our moral 
lives.”80 As an example, Zajonc et al. report that the faces of people who live 
together as romantic partners for 25 years end up looking like each other because 
they empathically mimic each other’s micro-expressions. “Empathy is a process 
that relies on the motor engagement of the face and on the resulting subjective 
experience of a correlated feeling state. The person who empathizes with another 
can actually appreciate the other's condition because of his or her own subjective 
experience. And for this subjective experience to take place, nothing more is 
required than a matching facial expression.”81  
Earlier we claimed that Molly and Holly were nearly behaviorally 
indistinguishable, since they both refrain from bragging and demur when praised. 
But subtle differences aren’t implausible. Over time, those around Holly will 
mimic her micro-expressions when she manifests intellectual humility. Our anti-
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individualist assertion then is that their intellectual humility depends upon and 
extends to Holly’s humility, and vice versa. They mutually reinforce each other.  
Alfano suggests another means for cultivating virtues through virtuous 
feedback loops: plausible, public, second-person attributions of virtues.82 
Publically telling someone “You are charitable” after they have just done 
something generous is likely to induce future behavior in that person that is 
consistent with the virtue of charity. This second-person virtue attribution 
contributes to their self-identity. It also prompts others to expect her to be 
charitable in the future. Such praise then is consistent with a sort of Confucian 
social ritual. When such plausible, public, second-person attributions of virtues 
become commonplace in a social milieu, the disposition of the individuals in that 
milieu cannot be explained apart from this practice. Their character traits are 
integrated with these external social conventions and rituals, such that they 
cannot be understood separately; they form one system.  
When it comes to intellectual humility, however, there is one small catch to 
Alfano’s proposal. By plausibly and publically telling someone that they are 
honest, courageous, or cleanly, she will likely start living up to those virtuous 
attributions. But as we’ve already seen, attributions of intellectual humility are 
tricky. I can’t attribute it to myself without contradiction. Having someone else 
tell me of my intellectual humility (and praise me for it, as Alfano advocates) will 
be counter-productive. Humility is a virtue of distraction. Such praise draws my 
attention to my humility thereby endangering it, just as pointing out to someone 
that she is in wu-wei can easily break her out of it. If, however, a teacher tells a 
student of Holly’s intellectual humility (when she is not present to hear), the 
teacher sets up Holly as an exemplar for the first student to emulate. Such speech 
is a sort of positive gossip, which functions as an indirect virtuous feedback loop.83 
The teacher can then further strengthen this feedback loop by later lauding the 
first student’s intellectual humility to Holly, so that my example serves to re-
enforce her intellectual humility. At that point, the first student’s intellectual 
humility is partially dependent the externalia of this social practice of positive 
gossip and Holly’s humility as well. This peculiar kind of virtuous feedback loop 
reveals a final anti-individualist element. If my intellectually humility requires me 
to be distracted from the fact that I possesses this trait, then generally I cannot 
(occurently) know that I am intellectual humble. Nevertheless, my intellectually 
humility depends on knowing that others (in this case Holly) are intellectually 
humility. She likewise has to know of my humility but not her own.  
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6. Conclusion 
The paradox of intellectual humility is a vexing problem if we are to attempt to 
educate for this virtue. Explicitly focusing on the value of intellectual humility is 
likely to produce only strategically modest students. Directly testing intellectual 
humility is unreliable. Self-reports of intellectual humility are self-contradictory. 
At first glance, it might seem therefore that one cannot know one is intellectually 
humble and further that educating for intellectual humility is a doomed 
enterprise. By looking to the Confucian, Doaist, and Mencian traditions in 
Chinese philosophy however—each of which has long grappled with a similar 
pardox for wu-wei—we have found a promising set of solutions. Educators should 
seek to distract students from their own burgeoning intellectual humility and 
through social rituals focus their attention on the intellectual humility of others so 
that students may imitate them. Consequently, for one to be intellectually 
humble, one must be part of a social milieu that includes other intellectually 
humble people and rituals that encourage intellectual humility. One must know 
others to be intellectually humble without paying attention to one’s own humility. 
